SB IPOs and IPO Anomalies: An Empirical Analysis of the Small Firm Uniqueness Hypothesis by Brau, James C. & Carpenter, C. Troy
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 16
Issue 2 Spring 2013 Article 4
December 2013
SB IPOs and IPO Anomalies: An Empirical
Analysis of the Small Firm Uniqueness Hypothesis
James C. Brau
Brigham Young University
C. Troy Carpenter
Brigham Young University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brau, James C. and Carpenter, C. Troy (2013) "SB IPOs and IPO Anomalies: An Empirical Analysis of the Small Firm Uniqueness
Hypothesis," The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance: Vol. 16: Iss. 2, pp. 75-96.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol16/iss2/4
THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE   VOL. 16, NO. 2 (SPRING 2013)  75-96 
 
Copyright © 2013 Academy of Behavioral Finance, Inc. All rights reserved.                              
ISSN: 1057-2287 
 
 
SB IPOs and IPO Anomalies: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Small Firm Uniqueness Hypothesis 
 
James C. Brau1 
Brigham Young University 
 
J. Troy Carpenter2  
Brigham Young University 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a direct test of the small-firm uniqueness hypothesis advanced 
by Ang (1991). We do this by using the SB-IPO program of the SEC as our instrument to define a 
small firm. Having identified small firms, we test the three IPO anomalies to see if small firms differ 
from large firms along these dimensions. We find that SB IPOs experience the three anomalies; 
however, they do so in disparate ways than mainline IPOs do. In sum, we provide support for the 
small firm uniqueness hypothesis. 
 
JEL Classification: G24, G28, G38 
Key words: IPO, Initial Public Offering, Anomalies, Small Firm Uniqueness, SB-2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
PRIOR STUDIES OF MAINLINE IPOS have demonstrated consistently that IPOs exhibit 
three primary “anomalies.” First, in seminal papers, Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) 
document that IPOs are underpriced on average. That is, the closing price soon after 
the IPO is significantly higher than the issue price for large samples over long periods 
of time. Second, Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) documented the long-
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run underperformance of mainline IPOs based on risk-adjusted benchmarks. Third, 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984) showed the existence of hot IPO markets 
based on underpricing and volume of issuance. 
The purpose of our paper is to empirically test if these anomalies are robust to 
small firms. Our instrument for a small firm is a firm that chooses to file for its IPO 
using the SB-2 program (instead of the mainline S-1 program).3 Our research question 
is of interest because extant literature argues that small businesses are unique (e.g., Ang, 
1991; Timmons and Spinelli, 2007). By empirically examining the three IPO 
anomalies in SB-2 IPOs vis-à-vis S-1 IPOs, it is possible to explicitly test the small-
business uniqueness hypothesis.  
In the aggregate, we find support for the small-firm uniqueness hypothesis—
small firms are different from large firms along many dimensions (Ang, 1991). We find 
that SB-2 IPOs differ along many dimensions from S-1 IPOs. For example, SB-2 IPOs 
tend to have less-prestigious auditors and underwriters. Finally, we demonstrate that 
while SB-2 IPOs appear to possess the same IPO anomalies that have been previously 
documented in the mainstream IPO literature, they do so in differing degrees. 
Surprisingly, SB-2 IPOs experience lower underpricing and at least as good long-run 
market-adjusted performance. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop 
the theoretical predictions driven from a review of the literature. The empirical work is 
detailed in the next section, consisting of Data, Empirical Methods, and Results. The 
final section concludes. 
 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND 
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
                                                 
 
3 A much lesser-known path to an IPO, designed specifically for small businesses is to file form SB-2 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The 1992 SB-2 legislation was enacted for the 
specific purpose of giving small firms less restricted access to US capital markets by reducing the burden 
for registration and reporting. For a firm to qualify to use the SB-2 form it must be located in either the 
US or Canada and had less than $25 million in revenues in the last fiscal year. It also must have less than 
$25 million in public float.  
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The convergence of the small firm uniqueness hypothesis and entrepreneurial 
finance has not received much academic attention. We have found five papers that have 
at least partially tested what we examine in this paper. The research of Brau and 
Osteryoung (2001) and Brau and Gee (2010) both study micro-IPOs while Bradley, 
Cooney, Dolvin, and Jordan (2006) study penny-stock IPOs. These studies implicitly 
examine the small firm-uniqueness hypothesis, although they do not explicitly state this 
is what they are doing. Brau and Carpenter (2012a,b) study SB-2 IPOs as a proxy for 
small firms. In this paper, we employ the same data as Brau and Carpenter (2012a,b) 
but ask fundamentally different questions. 
Brau and Osteryoung (2001) study SCOR prospectus companies. In the early 
1980s, the Reagan administration initiated policies to remove regulatory burdens from 
small businesses in an attempt to make acquiring capital less costly (i.e., same intent as 
the SB-2 program). Brau and Osteryoung (2001) examine marketing mechanisms, 
expenses, ownership, governance, offering characteristics, business life stage, and 
signaling variables for 73 SCORs from the state of Washington. They find the number 
of directors, size of the largest block, and early-stage offers all impact the success of a 
SCOR offering. 
Because SCORs do not have publicly-traded stock prices, Brau and Osteryoung 
(2001) define a successful offering as a firm that raised enough capital to break escrow. 
The limitations of non-public stock prices and unaudited financial statements prohibit 
the testing of the three IPO anomalies with the SCOR sample, and make the 
comparison with mainline IPOs very difficult. As a result, Brau and Osteryoung (2001) 
are not able to perform these tests. Our use of an SB-2 sample expands the research of 
small firm uniqueness by allowing us to perform this type of testing. In a follow-up 
study, Brau and Gee (2010) expand the study of SCORs to a national database.  
In contrast to SCORs, Bradley et al. (2006) study publicly-traded penny stocks 
and, as such, can examine the traditional IPO anomalies and can compare penny-stock 
IPOs with mainline IPOs. Bradley et al. (2006) define a penny-stock IPO as: 
 
“. . . an issue that meets the following three criteria: 1) is not issued by 
an investment advisor (e.g., not a closed-end fund), 2) its offer price is 
$5 or less, and 3) is not listed on a national exchange or market . . . . 
Thus, we classify IPOs listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq National 
Market as ‘ordinary’ without regard to their offer prices. IPOs listed on 
other markets (such as the Nasdaq SmallCap Market, OTC Bulletin 
Board, pink sheets or regional exchanges) are classified as penny stocks if 
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the offering is not issued by an investment advisor and the offer price is 
$5 or less.” 
 
By using this definition, Bradley et al. (2006) are able to examine the mainline 
(what they call “ordinary”) IPO issues of initial returns (i.e., underpricing), long-run 
performance, lockup lengths, and underwriting gross spreads. The extant mainline IPO 
literature demonstrates that IPOs are consistently, on average, underpriced (e.g., see the 
seminal work of Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975)). Underpricing, as defined by this 
literature, is typically the first-day return of the stock. As for IPO long-run 
performance, many studies of mainline IPOs (e.g., Ritter (1991) and Loughran and 
Ritter (1995)) show that IPOs underperform on a risk-adjusted basis. Pertaining to 
lockup lengths, Field and Hanka (2001) show that lockup lengths for mainline IPOs 
have clustered on 180 days. Finally, Chen and Ritter (2000) document that 
underwriter spreads have clustered at 7% for mainline IPOs. 
Bradley et al. (2006) find significant differences between penny-stock and non-
penny-stock IPOs. For the period 1990–1998, penny-stock IPOs have higher 
underpricing, lower long-run stock returns, longer lockups, and larger gross spreads. 
Specifically, penny-stock IPOs experience an average underpricing of 22.4%, 
significantly greater than ordinary IPOs (15.4%) at a p-value of 0.0003. The three-year 
(five-year) market-adjusted returns for penny-stock IPOs is -101.8% (-126.4%) 
contrasted with -39.9% (-55.2%) for ordinary IPOs (both p-values <0.01). As for 
lockups, the average length of the 207 penny-stock IPOs with data is 452 days, 
compared to 180 days for ordinary IPOs. Finally, penny-stock IPOs group around a 
standard underwriter spread of 10%, whereas ordinary IPOs group at 7%. 
In addition, the authors find penny-stock IPOs offered by underwriters who have 
undergone SEC enforcement actions have even higher underpricing (31.6%) and worse 
long-run returns (3-year = -131.8%, 5-year = -162.6%). Bradley et al. (2006) do not 
examine the issue of registration type (S-1 vs. SB-2). We believe our tests of the SB-2 
program to be the first. 
The mainline IPO literature has documented three traditional IPO anomalies: 
underpricing, long-run performance, and hot markets. In this section, we test to 
determine if these anomalies exist for SB-2 IPOs in an absolute and relative (i.e., to S-1 
IPOs) framework. Continuing the purpose of testing SB-2 IPO quality vis-à-vis S-1 
IPO quality, we test the following four hypotheses: 
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H1: SB-2 IPOs have significant, positive first-day underpricing which is 
higher than S-1 IPOs. 
H2: SB-2 IPOs have significant, negative long-run stock price performance 
which is worse than S-1 IPOs. 
H3: SB-2 IPOs delist for negative reasons more frequently than S-1 IPOs. 
H4: SB-2 IPOs have significant market cycles which are more volatile than 
S-1 IPOs. 
 
The data for underpricing, long-run returns, and delisting are taken from CRSP’s 
daily stock return files. Frequency of IPO issuance is taken from SDC. Beatty and 
Ritter (1986) argue and demonstrate in a seminal empirical paper on underpricing that 
firms with greater uncertainty have higher underpricing. If SB-2s are riskier (i.e., lower 
quality) than S-1 IPOs, we expect H1 to hold. Beginning with Ritter (1991) the long-
run stock performance of IPOs has been shown to be subpar, typically 
underperforming risk-adjusted or market benchmarks. If SB-2 IPOs are of lower 
quality (and if they are priced inefficiently at offering and by the initial market prices) 
then H2 follows. The delisting measure, H3, taken from Brau, Brown, and Osteryoung 
(2004), is an additional proxy for long-run outcome/performance. H4 is designed to 
test the hot market anomaly (e.g., Ritter, 1984).  
III. EMPIRICAL WORK 
A. Data 
We employ the same data and methods used by Brau and Carpenter (2012a) who 
distinguish small firms as those that filed an IPO using the SB-2 form, and compare 
them to similar-sized companies that issued an IPO with the standard S-1 form. 
Just as Brau and Carpenter (2012a), we begin with an initial sample of SB-2 and 
S-1 IPOs taken from the SDC’s New Issues database issued between 1993 and 2007 
(1993 was the first year with reliable SB-2 data and 2007 was the last year when an SB-
2 IPO was filed) and combine this with return and financial data from the CRSP and 
Compustat datasets. We calculate abnormal returns (defined subsequently) from the 
CRSP data and gather pre-IPO revenues from the Compustat data. After removing all 
firms with more than $25 million in sales and excluding all financial firms we are also 
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left with 1,899 IPOs in our final sample with 1,356 S-1 IPOs and 543 SB-2 IPOs.4  
Tables I and II report the frequency distributions for the sample parsed on issue year 
and industry, respectively.  
B. Empirical Methods and Results 
We define Initial Return (short-term), our proxy for IPO underpricing, as the 
first-day return from offer price to closing price (Bradley et al. (2006)). The One-Year 
Abnormal Return (long-term) is the cumulative raw return, adjusted for the CRSP all- 
index value-weighted cumulative return (Loughran and Ritter (1995)). Table IV 
reports the descriptive statistics as well as difference tests for these variables. Compared 
to the S-1 pooled sample, SB-2 IPOs have an average (median) Initial Return of 15% 
(8%) while S-1 IPOs have an average (median) of nearly 37% (13%). The difference in 
means (medians) – 22% (-5%) is significant with a p-value of 0.0001 (0.0001).5 The 
pair-matched results are very similar to these pooled results.  
Using pooled data, the S-1 IPO One-Year Abnormal Return average (median) is   
-9.9% (-35%) compared to the SB-2 average (median) of -17.0% (-33.5%). The 
difference in means (-7.2%) is significant (p = 0.0845); however, the difference in 
medians (1.5%) is not significant (p = 0.8642). The pair-matched benchmark sample is 
not consistent with the pool-matched sample in this instance. Using pair-matched 
firms, SB-2 IPOs outperform S-1 IPOs in the mean (2.2%, p = 0.6631) and in the 
median (9.2%, p = 0.0062). Because of this inconsistency, we will rely on the 
subsequent ordinary least square (OLS) and two stage least square (2SLS) multivariate 
results before interpreting the long-run results. 
In sum, using univariate analysis, H1 is rejected because SB-2 IPOs have 
significantly less underpricing than S-1 IPOs, contrary to predictions. The results for H2, 
long-run returns, are mixed. 
   
 
                                                 
 
4 We follow the same methods as Brau and Carpenter (2012a). See their data section for a detailed 
description of data collection. 
5 For a review of the IPO underpricing literature see Daily et al. (2003). 
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In order to more fully test Initial Return and One-Year Abnormal Return we 
estimate OLS and 2SLS regression models. Table V reports the results for Initial Return 
using the following OLS model:  
 
Initial Return = β1SB + β2Big Six + β3UWRank + β4log(Sales) + β5Cash 
Flow + β6Exchange + β7Overhang + β8log(Age) + β9VC + β10Debt/Assets 
+ β11Delaware Corp + β12Internet IPO + β13Dual Share Class + 
β14Lockup Length + β(years)Years(1993-2007) + β(industries)Industry1(A-I) + ε.      (1)
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These variables are all defined in Appendix A. Bruton, Chahine, and Filatotchev 
(2009) show that owner retention significantly impacts entrepreneurial IPO 
underpricing. As such, we use Overhang, defined as shares retained divided by primary 
shares sold (Bradley and Jordan (2002)).  
We estimate a two-stage model where the first stage contains a logit model 
modeling the choice of SB-2 or S-1. Several of the independent variables, as shown in 
Table III are significant including Big Six, log(Sales), Exchange, Delaware Corp, 
Offersize, Internet IPO, and Lockup Length. The purpose however, of the logit model is 
to estimate an SB-hat and then use it for the SB proxy variable in the OLS model with 
Initial Return as the dependent variable. As such, we will leave the inspection of Table 
III to the interested reader. 
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The primary variable of interest in Table V, Panel A is SB. The results indicate 
that we reject H1; SB-2s do not significantly under- or over-perform S-1 IPOs in the 
initial return. The OLS results seem to contradict the univariate results. However, 
Panel B, which removes the endogeneity of the SB-1 variable by using SB-hat, reports 
that in the pooled (pair-matched) benchmark sample, SB-2 IPOs have 2% (4%) less 
underpricing, both significant with p-values less than 0.0001. Thus, our univariate 
results are confirmed.  
Table VI reports the results for the following model which tests H2, first using 
OLS with SB (Panel A) and then using 2SLS with SB-hat (Panel B):  
 
One-Year Abnormal Return = 
β1SB + β2Underprice + β3Big Six + β4UW Rank + β5log(Sales) + β6Cash 
Flow + β7Exchange + β8ROA + β9log(Age) + β10VC + β11Debt/Assets + 
β12Delaware Corp + β13Internet IPO + β14Dual Share Class + β15Lockup 
Length + β16Book/Market + β(years)Years(1993-2007) + β(industries)Industry1(A-I) + ε. 
  
All of these variables are defined previously, except for Book/Market equity, and 
Underprice. We add Book/Market following Barber and Lyon (1997) who show it is an 
important factor in explaining long-run IPO returns. Underprice, as defined above, is 
the first closing price divided by the offer price. In the 2SLS model, we also construct 
an Underprice-hat variable using the model in Equation 3. We include Underprice and 
Underprice-hat based on McConaughy, Dhatt, and Kim (1995) who argue that poor 
long-run IPO performance is due to investors who overpay.  
The results in Table VI indicate that SB or SB-hat is only significant in the pair-
matched 2SLS model (Panel B, last two columns). In general, the four models in Table 
VI indicate that SB-2 IPOs do not underperform S-1 IPOs over one year, and may 
even outperform them by 3%. Thus, we reject H2. 
Table VII reports the frequency and various reasons that the companies in our 
sample were delisted. The statistics are for the first five years of a firm’s life, so we 
include the IPOs in our sample from 1993 to 2004, which is 97.6% of the SB-2 
sample, 93.2% of the pooled sample and 95.4% of the pair-matched sample. We do 
not include the later years of the sample because they do not have five years of life to 
 
 
 
(2)
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determine outcome. Panel A shows 259 (48.9%) of the SB-2 firms still actively trading 
(CRSP delist code 100) after five years, compared to 663 (52.6%) of the pooled S-1 
firms (Panel B), and 286 (55.2%) for the pair-matched sample (Panel C). Nearly one-
third, 30.8% (27.2% using pair-matched), of the S-1 firms merged with other 
companies (delist codes 200–261), compared to only 14.5% of the SB-2 firms. In 
contrast, only 16.3% (17.6% pair-matched) of the S-1 companies were delisted by the 
current exchange because of unmet standards (delist codes 550–587), compared to 
36.6% of the SB-2 companies. Examples of unmet standards include the security’s 
price falling below an acceptable level, insufficient assets, and not meeting the 
exchange’s financial guidelines.  
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If we consider the top two rows in each panel of Table VII to indicate success 
(active or merge) and the bottom two rows to indicate failure (liquidate or delist), then 
SB-2 IPOs have a 63.4% success rate whereas S-1 IPOs have 83.4% pooled and 82.4% 
pair-matched success rates. The chi-square z-statistic difference in frequencies is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.6 
Our final hypothesis, H4, addresses IPO hot issues markets and states that SB-2 
IPOs have significant market cycles which are more volatile than S-1 IPOs. “Hot IPO 
markets” are periods of either a) large numbers of IPOs or b) high underpricing. We 
begin our hot market analysis by charting the annual frequencies of IPOs (Figures I 
and II). In Figure I, we compare the SB-2 sample to the S-1 pooled sample to capture 
the volume of small S-1 IPOs in general. The figure reveals two main spikes (1996 and 
1999) for S-1 IPOs, along with smaller spikes in 2004 and 2007. The lower line on the 
figure, depicting SB-2, shows one spike in 1996, but none thereafter. Casual inspection 
thus suggests that S-1 IPOs experience a stronger IPO market cycle effect. In fact, the 
graph for the volume of SB-2 IPOs seems to suggest the legislature was a fad that was 
most popular in 1996, as opposed to displaying true hot markets cycling.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
6 We also compute parametric t-statistic difference in means and nonparametric Wilcoxon rank tests. 
The p-value for every test is less than 0.0001. 
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The hot markets literature uses not only the number of IPOs, but also the degree 
of underpricing to measure hot markets (Lowry and Schwert (2002)). Figure III charts 
the underpricing of the SB-2 sample compared to the pooled S-1 sample, and Figure 
IV charts the pair-matched S-1s. Note in both figures that both SB-2 and S-1 IPOs 
demonstrate cycles. The cycles are slightly more pronounced in Figure IV, with each 
type of IPO experiencing four peaks. Interestingly, only the 1999 peak coincides for 
both issue types. The underpricing hot issue market seems to be issue-type dependent 
and not an artifact of general market conditions.  
 
Next, we estimate the volatility of the number of IPOs by year to test the 
volatility of the two samples. The S-1 pooled sample has a standard deviation of 78.8 
compared to an SB-2 standard deviation of 42.5. The difference between the two is 
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significant beyond the 1% level. The number of S-1 IPOs is more volatile than the 
number of SB-2 IPOs.  
 
Examining the standard deviations of annual underpricing, the SB-2 sample 
experiences a standard deviation of 15.8% compared to 24.7% (pooled) and 26.8% 
(pair-matched). These differences are statistically different beyond the one percent 
level. The underpricing of S-1 IPOs is more volatile than the underpricing of SB-2 
IPOs. 
As a final examination, we compute a chi-square test comparing the frequency 
distribution in the number of IPOs for the SB-2 sample versus both S-1 IPO samples. 
Both chi-square tests indicate a statistically significant difference in frequencies beyond 
the one percent level. In sum, we confirm our initial hypothesis that SB-2 and S-1 
IPOs experience hot markets; however, SB-1 IPOs are more volatile in terms of 
number of IPOs and underpricing than SB-2 IPOs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our paper examines the three IPO phenomena of initial returns, long-run 
returns, and hot issue markets. We find that SB-2 IPOs have less underpricing than S-1 
IPOs. This result is surprising, as many of the measures of uncertainty indicated that 
SB-2 IPOs may be more risky than S-1 IPOs. Abnormal one-year returns indicate that 
SB-2 IPOs do not underperform S-1 IPOs, and in some specifications even 
significantly outperform S-1 IPOs. Again, these returns results are surprising 
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considering the earlier tests which indicated SB-2 IPOs may be of lower quality vis-à-
vis S-1 IPOs.  
We also document that SB-2 IPOs experience hot markets, especially when 
measured by underpricing. Surprisingly, SB-2 IPOs are less volatile than S-1 IPOs in 
terms of both numbers of IPOs issued per year and underpricing per year. 
Finally, we document additional support for the small-firm uniqueness 
hypothesis, namely that small firms are different from large firms along many 
dimensions. Our use of the SB-2 program adds another unique methodology to the 
extant literature, allowing us to statistically test if small firms differ from larger firms. 
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APPENDIX A: Variable Definitions 
 
Big Six  Dummy variable that indicates a company used one of the big six 
auditors at the time of the IPO (Arther Andersen, Coopers & 
Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. If a “big 6” auditor was used, this variable 
is assigned a ‘1’ value, if not, it is assigned a ‘0’. This variable is 
derived from the “auditor1” variable in the SDC data. 
 
Book/Market  Book to market ratio taken from Compustat’s common equity and 
CRSP’s outstanding shares and price to calculate the market value. 
 
Cash Flow  Inflation adjusted Compustat “OANCF – Operating Activities Net 
Cash Flow” data item. 
 
Debt/Assets  Calculated from Compustat “DLTT – Long‐Term Debt Total” divided 
by Compustat “AT – Assets Total”. 
 
Delaware Corp  Dummy variable that indicates a company filed its IPO in the state of 
Delaware. Assigned the value of “1” if the IPO was filed in Delaware, 
“0” if not. 
 
Dual Share Class  Dummy indicating if the firm had dual‐class shares. Derived from Jay 
Ritter’s list of 591 IPOs with multiple share classes outstanding 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/dual‐class‐ipo.htm). This 
variable is assigned a value of “1” if the IPO involved dual‐class 
shares, “0” if not. 
 
Exchange  The exchange where the IPO is listed. Taken from the SDC variable 
name “exchlisted”. 
 
Internet IPO 
 
Dummy variable that indicates if the firm filing an IPO is an internet 
company. Taken from Jay Ritter’s list of internet IPOs 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) shows that the internet bubble during 1999‐2000 had a 
dramatic effect on IPO underpricing. This variable is assigned a value 
of “1” if the company is an internet IPO, “0” if it is not. 
 
Lockup Length  Period of time following the IPO which insiders cannot sell company 
shares. This variable comes from the “lockupdays” variable in the 
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SDC data. 
 
Log(Age)  The “age” variable is the number of years from the founding of the 
company to the time of the IPO. Taken from Jay Ritter’s data set that 
includes founding dates for over 9,000 firms going public in the U.S. 
during 1975 to 2009 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm). We use 
the log of “age” in our models. 
 
Log(Sales)  This variable is taken from Compustat’s “REVT – Revenue Total” data 
item. We use the log of inflation adjusted sales in our models. 
 
Overhang  Shares retained divided by primary shares sold. 
 
SB  Dummy variable that indicates whether or not a firm filed the IPO 
using the SB‐2 form. If the firm used the SB‐2 form this variable is 
assigned a “1” value and “0” if not. Derived from the “secform” 
variable in the SDC data. 
 
Underprice  This variable is the calculated ratio of the first day’s price (from CRSP 
daily data field “prc”) divided by the offer price (take from SDC 
“offerprice”) minus 1. 
 
UW Rank  This variable represents the percentage share that an underwriter 
has of all IPO proceeds in the year of the IPO. This variable is derived 
from the two SDC variables “bookrun1” which is the name of the 
underwriter for the IPO and “proceeds” which is the amount of the 
proceeds from the IPO.  
 
VC  Dummy variable that indicates whether the company has venture 
capital backing. This variable is taken from the SDC “vcbacked” 
variable. A “1” is assigned if the company has backing from venture 
capital, “0” if not. 
   
 
 
 
 
